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In his novel De Loteling, first published in 1850, 
Hendrik Conscience tells the moving story of 
Jan Braems, a peasant’s son who took the place 
of a wealthier man for military service2. Upon 
entering the army, Jan contracts an inflammation 
of the eyes, which eventually turns him blind and 
shatters his plans for the future with his beloved 
Trien. To Conscience’s readers, the disease from 
which Jan suffered was well-known. In the first half 
of the nineteenth century, a particular epidemic 
was sweeping Belgium : the so-called “military 
ophthalmia”, a contagious eye disease that was 
originally most prominent among soldiers. In the 
novel, Jan’s disease is also diagnosed as such. When 
he and Trien encounter a retired army physician on 
their journey back home, the physician’s assistant, 
upon inspecting Jan’s eyes, proclaims : “He is blind ! 
It is the old soldiers’ disease. We know this plague. 
But behold the left eye again, Major, it seems to me 
that it is not yet entirely lost ?”3 The former army 
physician then miraculously (and free of charge) 
succeeds in saving Jan’s left eye by applying a white 
ointment, a cure for which Jan and Trien remained 
grateful throughout their lives. Conscience’s novel 
thus ends with the image of the (army) physician as 
a philanthropist. 
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The ophthalmia epidemic in Belgium, to 
which Jan Braems fell victim, had a con-
siderable history by 1850, one that extended 
beyond Belgian borders and dated back to 
the revolutionary wars. British historians 
have traced back its origins to the conflict 
between French and British troops in Egypt 
between 1798 and 1801. In those years, 
British soldiers suffered from eye infections 
that were unknown to British army doctors, 
who spoke of “Egyptian ophthalmia”4. As the 
British returned home, the disease traveled 
with them, circulating further among the 
nation’s garrisons, but also affecting the 
general population. The military campaigns 
of 1814 turned military ophthalmia into a 
European disease, as it spread through the 
armies in the Low Countries, Prussia and 
Russia. In the Southern Netherlands, the first 
reports of soldiers with the characteristic 
granulations on the conjunctiva around 
their eyelids (which were hence called des 
granulés) appeared in the late 1810s5. After 
the Belgian Révolution, the disease circulated 
further among Belgian soldiers, but was also 
transmitted to the civilian population at large. 
1. My gratitudes goes out to the participants in the Forum Cultural History on 5 June 2015, 
to editors Josephine Hoegaerts and Nel de Mûelenaere, and to the reviewers for their helpful 
suggestions to develop this article. 2. Hendrik ConsCienCe, De Loteling, Antwerpen, 1850. 
3. Idem, p. 134 : “Hy is blind! Het is de oude soldatenkwael. Wy kennen die plaeg. Maer 
bezie het linker oog eens, Majoor; het is nog niet gansch weg, dunkt my ?”. 4. CatHerine 
kelly, War and the Militarization of British Army Medicine, 1793-1830, London, 2011, p. 
51-52; luke davidson, “‘Identities Ascertained’ : British Ophthalmology in the First Half of 
the Nineteenth Century”, in Social History of Medicine, no. 9, 1996, p. 313-333. 5. See for 
example : JosepH-François kluyskens, Dissertation sur l’ophthalmie contagieuse qui règne dans 
quelques bataillons de l’armée des Pays-Bas, Gand, 1819. 6. A brief overview of the decisions 
taken by the military to contain ophthalmia in Belgium is included in : e. evrard, J. MatHieu, 
r.J. François & r. MoortHaMers, Asklepios onder de wapens. 500 jaar militaire geneeskunde 
in België, Brussel, 1997, p. 211-212. The Leuven ophthalmologist Luc Missotten has identified 
the disease as trachoma : luC Missotten, “Napoleon en de Leuvense oogheelkunde” (Lecture 
on 12 March 2013). 7. Henri deCondé, Hygiène de l’ophthalmie dite des armées, Liège, 1844. 
8. luC de vos, Het effectief van de Belgische krijgsmacht en de militiewetgeving, 1830-1914, 
Brussel, 1985, p. 73-95.
The decision made in 1834 by a commission 
of military physicians to send infected soldiers 
home to recover accelerated this process6. In 
the following decades, the epidemic reached 
its peak. In 1844, the army doctor Henri 
Decondé tellingly proposed to use the term 
“ophthalmia of the people” instead of “military 
ophthalmia”. According to his estimates, one 
sixth of the Belgian population was infected, a 
startling figure7. 
If the ophthalmia epidemic thus easily crossed 
the borders between the army and civilian 
society, the historiography of the disease has 
run up against difficulties in following this 
movement. In studies of the Belgian army, the 
disease has mostly been regarded – in line 
with its description in Conscience’s novel – 
as an important cause of the overall aversion 
to the army. Indeed, the encounter with blind 
soldiers and with those who deserted out of 
fear for the disease left a deep impression on 
the civilian population8. The social impact 
of the disease, however, was much broader. 
As ophthalmia spread from army barracks to 
civilians’ houses, it inspired the combina-
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tion of governmental and philanthropic initia-
tives (e.g. subsidized dispensaries for eye 
diseases), it shaped social views on blindness 
and disability, it stimulated research into 
eye diseases and the development of oph-
thalmology, and it triggered a public debate 
on the long-term social effects of the disease 
and the responsibility of the government for 
the health of (former) soldiers. Each of these 
topics offers new perspectives to study the 
army as a less isolated institution and focus 
more on its relation to civilian society. To 
realize this potential, a broad perspective 
is needed. Indeed, much of the medical 
knowledge on the disease, expertise in patient 
care and questions of financing did not 
remain limited to the military. A combined 
analysis of military and civilian responses to 
the epidemic may allow us to study the army 
as an actor in histories of medicine, public 
health and disability9. 
This article puts one of these possible 
perspectives into practice. It analyzes the 
development of ophthalmology in Belgium, 
a specialized medical subfield that bene-
fited from the considerable investments to 
contain the epidemic. It focuses in particular 
on the early history of the Belgian military 
health service, at a time when army doctors 
tried to affirm their authority on ophthalmia. 
Given its primary appearance among soldiers, 
military physicians took a leading role in 
research on the disease. But just as the 
epide mic itself did not respect the boun-
daries between the army and the general 
population, neither was medical knowledge 
on ophthalmia strictl y limited to the military. 
In shaping their position as specialists on 
the disease, military physicians needed to 
cooperate and compete with a wide range 
of experts, while at the same time taking 
into account the views of politicians and the 
broader public, who followed their efforts 
closely. Military physicians were well aware 
of these sensitivities and perceptions, but 
also understood the advantages of conduc-
ting medical studies within the hierar-
chical structure of the Belgian army, in 
which patients’ protests mattered far less 
than in civilian practice. Their writings on 
ophthalmia therefore serve as a window 
on the boundaries between military and 
civilian medicine in mid-nineteenth century 
Belgium.
In the following paragraphs, I will show 
how army doctors’ position as specialists in 
ophthalmology developed parallel to the 
trajectory of ophthalmia, as it was transmitted 
from the army to the civilian population. 
First, I will discuss the medical infrastructure 
that army doctors had at their disposal, both 
within and outside of the Belgian military 
health service. Second, I will look at military 
physicians’ confrontations with other experts 
in eye diseases. In the third section, I will 
study one of these confrontations – with 
the rural physician Jean Fierens. Followed 
closely in the general press, the controversy 
sheds new light on the public’s view of 
army doctors’ capabilities. The fourth and 
final section will measure the effects of 
specialization on military medicine and “civi-
9. See for example : pieter verstraete & CHristine van everbroeCk, Verminkte stilte : de Belgische 
invaliden van de Groote Oorlog / Le silence mutilé : les invalides belges de la Grande Guerre, 
Namur, 2015. 
A scene from Conscience’s De loteling : the blind soldier Jan Braems, accompanied 
by Trien, resting on his way home. (Hendrik ConsCienCe, De loteling, Brussels, 
Lebègue, 1914, p. 10)
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lian” ophthalmology. By the middle of the 
century, the privileged position of ophthal-
mological research within the Belgian army 
disappeared as the disease spread to the 
civilian population at large. 
I. An Infrastructure for Experiments 
The Belgian military health service was created 
parallel to the organization of the Belgian army 
in 1830. During the summer protests against 
the Dutch ruler, a Military Health Council was 
put together, which determined the general 
structure of the new service, modelling it 
after the Dutch military health service esta-
blished in 1814. Its priority was setting up 
the necessary medical infrastructure, which 
resulted in the (re)opening of six “primary” 
and four “secondary” military hospitals. The 
leading figure behind these reforms was Jean-
François Vleminckx, a physician with strong 
liberal sympathies who belonged to the inner 
circle of the new political leadership10. When 
the Military Health Council was abolished in 
January 1831 and replaced by a hierarchical 
chain of command, Vleminckx became the 
first “inspector general” of the military health 
service, a function he held until 1864. It meant 
the start of a successful, yet contested career 
in state service, as he combined his military 
functions with numerous positions outside of 
the army, such as the presidency of the Belgian 
Academy of Medicine (established in 1841) 
and the inspectorship of the health services 
of the railways and prisons. The combination 
of these different jobs brought about a lot of 
critique from his medical colleagues, some 
of them considering his policies authoritarian 
and self-interested11. 
At the foundation of the military health 
service, most army doctors did not possess 
an academic medical degree. They were 
socalled “health officers” (officiers de santé), 
a second-class medical degree, obtained 
at private schools and introduced during 
the French occupation. Vleminckx tried to 
remedy this situation in the 1830s and 1840s 
by encouraging further academic study and 
by only appointing new army doctors with 
academic degrees. At the Leuven military 
hospital, he founded an officers’ school for 
the Belgian army doctors, a training center 
similar to those of neighboring countries 
(e.g. in Utrecht and Paris)12. How ever, 
due to budget cuts, this school was soon 
abolished. An academic medical degree was 
hence the only prerequisite to apply for a 
position as army doctor. In case of multiple 
candidates, a comparative exam on military-
medical matters was held, after which one 
10. e. evrard, “De omwenteling van 1830”, in e. evrard, J. MatHieu, r.J. François & r. 
MoortHaMers,  Asklepios onder de wapens…, p. 125-143. 11. For a discussion of the critique 
from the rank and file of the medical profession on the ‘elitist’ academy and its president : 
rita sCHepers, De opkomst van het medisch beroep in België. De evolutie van de wetgeving 
en de beroepsorganisaties in de 19de eeuw, Amsterdam, 1989, p. 83-87. 12. Vleminckx had 
the model of the école d’application of the French military hospital Val-de-Grâce in Paris in 
mind : J. MattHieu, “De Belgische militaire gezondheidsdienst in de 19de eeuw”, in e. evrard, 
J. MatHieu, r.J. François & r. MoortHaMers,  Asklepios onder de wapens…, p. 205-232. On 
the medical training of the Dutch army doctors : daniel de Moulin, “’s Rijkskweekschool voor 
militaire geneeskundigen te Utrecht (1822-1865)”, in Nieuwe Nederlandse bijdragen tot de 
geschiedenis der geneeskunde en der natuurwetenschappen 26, Amsterdam, 1988. 
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could acquire a certificate. Medical students 
who continued their studies during their army 
services by working in military hospitals had 
a clear advantage in these exams. In 1848, 
a system of salaried medical studies was set 
up, the beneficiaries of which committed 
themselves to enter the military health service 
after their studies. By then, the military 
medical corps – parallel to the army as a 
whole – had decreased in size, from 189 army 
doctors in 1836 to 130 in 1841. The goal was 
thus a smaller, but better educated medical 
community13. 
The struggle against ophthalmia coincided 
with these reforms. It formed one of the driving 
forces behind the speedy reorganization of the 
military health service. During the re opening 
of the military hospitals, separate rooms were 
created for soldiers suffering from the disease 
– a recommendation made during the visit of 
the French army physician Domi nique Larrey 
in 183114. Later on, the existing nine military 
hospitals, located in Belgium’s major cities, 
were complemented with so-called dépôts 
– in Namur, Ypres and Beverloo – that were 
specifically intended to receive the soldiers 
affected with the disease, whose number by 
1837 had grown to 7.000. In 1839, these 
dépôts were replaced by one military ophthal-
mological institute, which was housed in the 
Leuven military hospital. The new institute 
was directed by Frédéric Hairion, who had 
been appointed Professor of Oph thalmology 
in 1836 at that city’s Catholic University. 
Two years later, Jean Julien Van Roosbroeck 
was appointed to a similar chair at the State 
University of Ghent15. Top ranking military 
physicians thus facilitated an early acade-
mic status for ophthalmology, which, given 
the expansion of the military hospitals and 
the Leuven ophthalmological institute, had 
a considerable clinical infrastructure at its 
disposal.
Another type of infrastructure was realized 
in the form medical journals and societies, 
which equally treated the question of military 
ophthalmia; the gravity of the epidemic served 
as a means to show the relevance of these 
new scientific venues. In 1836, the Bulletin 
médical belge, invited “all physicians who 
have gathered facts that might help elucidate 
the question of ophthalmia in the army” to 
submit their observations for publication16. 
One year later, the Society of Medical and 
Natural Sciences of Brussels organized a prize 
competition on the origins of ophthalmia, 
which received a lot of attention in the 
me dical press17. Army doctors were well 
13. e. evrard, “Kinderziekten en groeipijnen van de gezondheidsdienst”, in e. evrard, J. 
MatHieu, r.J. François & r. MoortHaMers, Asklepios onder de wapens…, p. 195-202. 14. On 
Larrey’s visit, see : id., “Het bezoek van Larrey in België”, in e. evrard, J. MatHieu, r.J. François 
& r. MoortHaMers, Asklepios onder de wapens…, p. 175-181. 15. On Van Roosbroeck’s 
career : Jean-JaCques de laey, “Van Roosbroeck, Jean Julien (1810-1869)”, in UGentMemorie, 
accessed on 13 May 2016 (www.ugentmemorie.be/personen/van-roosbroeck-jean-
julien-1810-1869). 16. “Note du rédacteur”, in Bulletin médical belge (BMB), no. 3, 1836 
(5), p. 125 : “tous les médecins qui auraient recueilli des faits propres à éclairer la question de 
l’ophthalmie de l’armée”. 17. The Society offered the considerable sum of 1500 F. for the best 
study : “Société des Sciences médicales et naturelles de Bruxelles”, in BMB, no. 4, 1837 (2), 
p. 33. This sum had been donated by “a philanthropist from St. Petersburg” in the previous 
year and applauded by the members of the Brussels Society : “Ophthalmie”, in BMB, no. 3, 
1836 (6), p. 148. 
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represented among the society members and 
journals editors that shaped this “civilian” 
medical world. Florent Cunier was the most 
active among them. More than any of his 
colleagues in the army, Cunier understood 
the opportunities offered by the booming 
periodical press for research on ophthalmia. 
Appointed as an army physician after the 
Belgian Revolution, he climbed the ladder 
in the military health service, developing at 
the same time a career in medical journa-
lism18. As a contributor to the Bulletin médi-
cal belge, he reviewed foreign studies and 
commented upon new experiments done 
in oph thalmology, becoming its editor-in-
chief in 1839. One year later, he foun ded 
the Annales d’oculistique, which promo-
ted ophthalmology as a medical special-
ty and focused on an audience of mostly, 
but not exclusively, French and Belgian phy-
sicians. According to the French ophthal-
mologist Carron du Villard, the journal 
formed “a new tribune for specialized 
men”, a forum to share expertise in oph-
thalmology both by military and civil medical 
practitioners. 
Even if the Annales were more specialized 
than the Bulletin, both journals shared the 
same ambition of advancing a new type of 
clinical, observation-based medical study19. 
Such research was perceived as a clear 
break with the past. By 1840, the army 
doctor Constant Loiseau indeed looked 
back negatively on previous, all too theore-
tical studies on ophthalmia, “[which had 
been] imagined in the silence of one’s study 
and which one no longer finds at the pa-
tient’s bedside”; such theories formed “superb 
scholastic preten tions that are refuted by 
facts every day”20. It was an indirect critique 
of the debate over the nature of military 
ophthalmia that had been conducted during 
the 1820s. Medical opinion had been divi-
ded in two clear camps. The “compres-
sionists”, to which Vleminckx belonged, 
believed the disease was related to soldiers’ 
everyday habits, most notably their wearing 
of tight uniforms, which applied too much 
pressure on their bodies and could turn a 
harmless inflam mation of the eye into “mili-
tary ophthalmia”21. The “contagionists”, on 
the other hand, argued for the contagious 
nature of the disease and its spreading 
from garrison to garrison, and across natio-
nal borders. In the course of the 1830s, 
a consensus emerged, which emphasized 
the contagious nature of the disease, but 
also recognized that soldiers’ “predisposi-
tion” to contract ophthalmia was closely 
18. Staff record of Florent Cunier (Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and of Military 
History (from here on : RMAF), Officers’ files, no. 4150). 19. On the development of clinical 
medicine in Europe : otHMar keel, L’avènement de la médecine clinique moderne en 
Europe, 1750-1815. Politiques, institutions et savoirs, Montréal, 2001; volker Hess, Von der 
semiotischen zur diagnostischen Medizin. Die Entstehung des klinischen Methode zwischen 
1750 und 1850, Husum, 1993. 20. Constant loiseau, “Sur l’ophthalmie de l’armée belge”, 
in Annales d’oculistique, no. 4, 1840-1841, p. 48 : “imaginée dans le silence du cabinet 
et que l’on ne retrouve plus au lit du malade” and “ces superbes prétentions scolastiques 
démenties chaque jour par les faits”. 21. See for example : Jean-François vleMinCkx, Essai sur 
l’ophthalmie de l’armée des Pays-Bas, Bruxelles, 1825. 
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22. See the report on the state of the art presented by the French physician Caffe to the Parisian 
Academy of Medicine after his trip to Belgium : “Ophthalmie de l’armée belge. Rapport lu à 
l’Académie royale de Médecine de Paris, par M. Bouvier, sur un mémoire de M. Caffe”,  in 
Annales d’oculistique, no. 2, 1839-1840, p. 123-133. 23. “Du traitement employé par M. 
Buys pour combattre les granulations palpébrales. Essais comparatifs au dépôt ophthalmique 
de Namur”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 2, 1839-1840, p. 224-225 : “le meilleur moyen de 
fixer une bonne fois les opinions contradictoires, et d’en finir avec ces questions d’amour-
propre qui divisent nos officiers de santé”. 24. Idem, p. 227 : “agissant sur des soldats dociles, 
[ils] arrivent beaucoup plus tôt au but”. 25. saloMon laurillard-Fallot, “Quelques mots sur la 
cau térisation des granulations palpébrales”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 1, 1838 (3), p. 50 : 
“de trop vives résistances de la part des malades et ne pas les placer dans l’alternative de la 
révolte ou du découragement”. 26. Report of November 20, 1840 of Dr. Lepage to Dr. Vle -
minckx (RMAF, Service de Santé, no. 2323), “parce que les malades, ne voyant aucun chan-
gement avantageux dans leur état, se décourageaient et ne voulaient plus se soumettre à de 
nouvelles cautérisations”. 27. “Nouvelles diverses”, in L’indépendance belge, August 27, 
1838.
related to the hygienic circumstances in the 
army22. Emphasis now shifted to the best 
therapies for the disease. The method of 
cauterizing a part of patients’ affected eyes, 
in particular, evoked much attention. 
The comparative experiment, during which 
different treatments were tested and com-
pared, became the primary means of arbi-
trating between these differing viewpoints. 
Such experiments, in the words of the editors 
of the Annales d’oculistique, formed “the best 
means to once and for all give short shrift to 
contradictory opinions, and end these matters 
of vanity that divide our medical officers in 
the military”23. The large groups of patients 
in the military hospitals and dépôts created 
ideal circumstances to comparatively test 
different treatments. In the eyes of many 
civilian physicians, such access was highly 
advantageous. They pointed to army doctors’ 
particular relation to patients – soldiers, not 
citizens from the urban bourgeoisie – which 
allowed them, in the more hierarchical setting 
of the army, to administer more painful, but 
also more effective treatments : “Working with 
docile soldiers, [they] reach their goal much 
earlier”24. The dialogue between civilian pa-
tients and physicians on the right treatment to 
be administered was replaced by a chain of 
direct orders in the army. 
Military physicians put such advantages 
into perspective. They pointed to the diffi-
culties of treating soldiers. If large groups 
of patients facilitated comparative experi-
ments, they also held a danger of collective 
protests. In 1838, Laurillard-Fallot warned 
against applying too painful treatments, to 
avoid evoking “an all too strong resistance 
on behalf of the ill and to not steer them 
towards the alternative of revolt or demora-
lization”25. In the report of an experiment 
conducted in 1840, it was mentioned that 
the experi ment was stopped, “because 
the ill, who viewed no impro vements in 
their condition, became discouraged, and 
did not want to submit themselves to new 
cauterizations”26. This fear of “demoralization” 
cast a shadow over the experimental cul-
ture within the army, which also faced an 
increasingly negative image as reports of 
new cases of ophthalmia appeared in the 
newspapers – reports that were themselves 
said to have such a demoralizing effect27. 
For the military physicians, keeping up 
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soldiers’ morale and avoiding – all too strong 
– protests were part of the particularities of 
the army as an experimental setting. In that 
sense, they also identified themselves with 
the overall mission of the army. Against a 
background of political tensions with the 
Netherlands in the 1830s, the army’s main 
task was indeed to prepare for a possible 
war, which meant controlling soldiers and 
enforcing discipline. 
II. Quacks and Tourists
Despite military physicians’ privileged access 
to patients and to newly developing scientific 
forums, they did not succeed in acquiring a 
monopoly of knowledge on the epidemic. The 
general interest in the disease attracted a wide 
range of “experts” from within and outside the 
country, with or without medical degrees, and 
with little or great scientific ambitions. Army 
doctors’ interaction with these self-proclaimed 
experts was a matter of constructing authority. 
Whether or not to cooperate with them, and 
take their arguments and treatments seriously, 
were decisions that established boundaries, 
and therefore shaped ophthalmology as a 
specialized field and army doctors’ position in 
it. Or, in the words of the sociologist of science 
Thomas Gieryn, the shaping of ophthalmology 
was a matter of boundary-work28. 
One of the problems military physicians 
faced in differentiating themselves from other 
aspiring experts was the negative connotation 
of the terms “specialist” or “specialty” in the 
mid-nineteenth century. At a time when re-
formers stressed the unity of the medical 
field – the introduction of a unified degree in 
medicine, surgery and obstetrics in Belgium 
in 1849 testifies of this program29 – the 
place of “subfields” or “separate branches” 
within medicine was not self-evident. More 
specifically for ophthalmology, travelling mer-
chants of spec tacles and manufacturers of 
artificial glass eyes equally stressed their 
special knowledge and presented them-
selves as “oculists” or “professors of oph-
thal mology”, thus using the same termino-
logy as contemporary army doctors and 
academics30. An association there fore arose 
between specialization and quac kery, which 
reflected the difficulties of establishing “in-
ternal” divisions within the medical field 
at a time when the “outer” professional 
boun daries – between physicians and non-
physicians – were equally in the making. 
For ophthalmology in particular, the difficul-
ties ophthalmologists experienced in freeing 
them selves from the pejorative meanings at-
tri buted to specialization seem to illustrate 
George Weisz’s argument that in order for 
specialization to develop, the unity of the 
medical field needed to be established first31. 
28. tHoMas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science : Credibility on the Line, Chicago/London, 
1999. 29. On medical legislation in nineteenth-century Belgium : rita sCHepers, “Towards 
Unity and Autonomy : The Belgian Medical Profession in the Nineteenth Century”, in 
Medical History, no. 38, 1994 (3), p. 237-254. 30. The relation between ophthalmologists 
and these traveling merchants caused a heated debate in the Annales d’oculistique, see 
for example : “Une nuée de marchands de lunettes et de fabricants d’yeux artificiels”, in 
Annales d’oculistique, no. 11, 1844, p. 57-60. 31. GeorGe Weisz, “The Emergence of Medical 
Specialization in the Nineteenth Century”, in Bulletin of the History of Medicine, no. 77, 
2003, p. 536-575.
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Within such a competitive context, a strong 
defense of ophthalmology as a specialized 
subfield was needed. The French “physician-
oculist” Lusardi, in a peculiar opinion piece, 
claimed the superiority of specialists over 
“encyclopedists” in the medical field32. He 
deplored how the specialist was reproached 
with being “a backward being, with little and 
limited knowledge, with an instinct for greed 
and quackery”33. In commenting on Lusardi’ 
piece, the editorial board of the Annales 
d’oculistique added more elements to Lusardi’s 
indictment. In defending specialization, the 
editors affirmed the journal’s own raison d’être. 
The increasing accumulation of scientific facts 
necessitated specialization, they claimed, as 
individual physicians could no longer master 
all aspects of medical practice. Specialization 
was thus a sign of scientific progress rather 
than quackery. It was also this reasoning 
that led the editorial board to clash with the 
Parisian Academy of Medicine. In a discussion 
on Belgian ophthalmia, the Academy had, 
according to the editors, wrongfully passed 
over the many studies of Belgian military 
physicians, a testimony of the academicians’ 
inadequate knowledge of the specialized 
literature34. In reinforcing its claims, it cited 
from the Gazette médicale de Paris, in which 
a critique on the all too brief discussion in the 
Parisian Academy had equally resulted in a 
call for more specialization : “special diseases 
require specialized physicians”35. 
Similar tensions, typical of an emerging spe-
cialty pressed in between quackery and 
general medicine, occurred within the army’s 
military health service. The potential of ob-
taining a reward from the Belgian government 
attracted a wide range of experts in the 1830s, 
who presented their remedies to the Secretary 
of War, Jean-Pierre Willmar. The applicants 
typically stressed the unknown composition 
of their ointments, a family secret passed on 
for generations, but did not hesitate to mock 
medical men : since all “the grand surgeons 
and celebrated physicians” had failed to find 
the cause of the disease, one of them added, 
the answer might as well come from “a man 
of simplicity, like myself”36. Most of these 
claims were easily dismissed by Vleminckx, 
who judged such folk remedies to be “known 
for a long time already” and “to be found in 
all ophthalmological textbooks as well as 
in all pharmacopoeias”37. But when politi-
cians interfered, medical authority was far less 
easily affirmed. A recipe for a potion acquired 
by a parliamentarian was simply ordered to 
be tested in the Brussels military hospital. The 
decision caused annoyance with Vleminckx, 
who wrote to Willmar : “every time such 
experiments take place (...) they have turned 
32. On Lusardi, see also : Mart van lieburG, “Het bezoek van de oculist Lusardi aan het 
Rotterdams gasthuis (1827)”, in Rotterdams Jaarboekje, no. 3, 1975, p. 165-175. 33. lusardi, 
“Réponse d’un spécialiste aux attaques des encyclopédistes”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 
11, 1844, p. 50 : “un être rétrograde, à la vue basse et bornée, aux instincts cupides et 
charlatanesque”. 34. “Réflexions sur la discussion de l’Académie”, in Annales d’oculistique, 
no. 2, 1839-1840, p. 133-137. 35. Idem, p. 137 : “les maladies spéciales exigent des médecins 
spéciaux”. 36. Letter of 13 August 1846 of Mr. Vandenbossche-Vankelecom to the Belgian King 
(RMAF, Service de Santé, no. 2329) : “un homme de toute simplicité comme moi”. 37. Note 
of 20 September 1838 of Dr Lepage (RMAF, Service de Santé, no. 2301) :“[les collyres] sont 
connus depuis longtemps et ils se trouvent dans tous les ouvrages d’ophtalmologie de même 
que dans tous les formulaires médicaux”.
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38. Letter of Jean-François Vleminckx to Jean-Jacques Willmar s.d. [1838-1839] (RMAF, 
Service de Santé, no. 2310) : “Chaque fois que des essais du genre de celui-ci (...) ont eu 
lieu, il ont toujours tourné au désavantage non seulement de leur procureur mais des malades 
sur lesquels ils étaient pratiqués. Je vous supplie en conséquence, Monsieur le Ministre, de 
ne plus en ordonner à l’avenir; je l’ai déjà dit à plusieurs reprises, il n’y a point de remède 
spécifique contre l’ophthalmie, qui doit être traitée d’après les symptômes qu’elle présente à 
ses différents stades”. 39. “Variétés”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 1, 1838 (4), p. 118-120. 
40. Idem, p. 118 : “des oculistes touristes”. 
out disadvantageously for the maker and 
for the ill on whom they were practiced. I 
therefore request you, M. Secretary, not to 
order them in the future; I have mentioned it 
many times before; there does not exist one 
specific cure for ophthalmia, which has to be 
treated according to the symptoms it presents 
during its different stages”38. 
Vleminckx’s response suggests, first of all, that 
experiments with new treatments were not 
uncommon in the military health service. But 
it also reveals that the military hierarchy could 
work to the disadvantage of army doctors. 
The chain of command allowed military 
physicians, who were officers, to administer 
(painful) treatments to soldiers without much 
discussion, but when orders to test new 
treatments came from above, their medical 
autonomy and judgment became restricted. 
These procedures seem to have frustrated 
Vleminckx, who struggled to convey his 
medical argumentation on the complexities of 
the disease to Willmar. 
Foreign ophthalmologists formed another 
category of aspiring experts. The considerable 
size of the ophthalmia epidemic in Belgium 
had, in fact, attracted the attention of many 
foreign physicians, who traveled to Belgium 
to study the disease and its treatment. 
Welcoming them was a matter of courtesy in 
a tradition of scientific travel in which Belgian 
doctors themselves participated – Cunier 
had for example traveled across France to 
study eye diseases. Encounters with foreign 
colleagues also fit in with a certain spirit of 
internationalism in ophthalmology, of which 
the Annales d’oculistique, which presented 
itself explicitly as an international journal, 
testified. Besides Larrey’s visit in 1831, the 
German Professor of Ophthalmology Johann 
Christian Jüngken had been invited from Berlin 
in 1834 to join a commission on the measures 
to stop the ophthalmia epidemic from 
spreading. It was this commission that took 
the decision to send infected soldiers home 
to recover, resulting in an entirely opposite 
effect. In the same tradition, the French spe-
cialist in eye diseases Paul Caffe made a tour 
of the Belgian hospitals, which was much 
anticipated in the Annales d’oculistique. For 
the editors, Caffe’s assessment could highlight 
the sound work done by the Belgian military 
physicians, and confirm once and for all the 
contagious nature of the disease39. 
The travels of foreign specialists were not 
always assessed in a positive way. An anxiety 
was also present among Belgian ophthalmo-
logists that a too strong reliance on foreign 
expertise would weaken their own scientific 
status. Some of these foreigners were des-
cribed as “touristy oculists” [oculistes touris-
tes] who only visited one or two hospitals and 
then drew up their self-assured conclusions40. 
59 Belgian Army Doctors (1830-1860)
Pleasurable travel had taken the upper hand 
over sound scientific work, it was sugges-
ted. Vleminckx similarly did not welcome 
all foreign experts with equal enthusiasm. 
In his report of the visit of the Parisian Prof-
es sor of Ophthalmology Goudret, he dis-
credited Goudret by stating that “he had 
no idea of our ophthalmia and the lesions 
it brings forth”41. Vleminckx, however, did 
not question Goudret’s status as a renow-
ned ophthalmologist – his Parisian acade-
mic titles had in fact swayed Willmar to 
allow the experiment and Vleminckx as 
well recog nized he was “strongly engaged 
in eye diseases”42. He rather stressed 
the local character of the disease, “our 
ophthalmia”, which seemingly necessitated 
locally grounded knowledge and expe-
rience. In the Annales d’oculistique, such 
local, special knowledge was linked to 
army doctors’ proximity to soldiers’ lives. 
Unlike the tourists, military physicians 
“live with the soldier, identify themselves 
with their lives, and know him both in his 
state of health and his state of disease”43. 
Such a strategy generally worked well 
when employed in the direct dialogues bet-
ween military physicians and the army 
leadership. It tied ophthal mologists’ profes-
sional agenda with the army leadership’s 
patriotic views by advancing a flexible notion 
of special knowledge on “Belgian” military 
ophthalmia.  
III. Fierens’ Secret Remedy
Another challenger, the rural physician Jean 
Fierens, was far less easily put aside. Born 
in Antwerp in 1792, and having studied 
surgery in Ghent, Fierens possessed clear 
medical credentials. He was also familiar 
with the particular manifestation of “Belgian” 
ophthalmia. His private practice in Beervelde, 
a village located twelve kilometers east of 
Ghent, became a widely known center for 
the treatment of ophthalmia. In the general 
press, it was described as “a meeting place for 
the blind, tens of them make their way to the 
physician’s residence every day”44. Fierens’ 
public fame turned him into a formidable 
opponent for the military physicians. Perhaps 
to further augment his fame, or in the hope 
of a profit, he had offered to the Secretary 
of War to treat a number of soldiers with his 
secret healing method. This offer meant the 
start of a fierce controversy between him 
and the army doctors – a controversy that 
illustrates the difficulties that army doctors 
ran up against when defending their methods 
in a public debate. Unlike the disputes with 
foreign academics, the polemic with Fierens 
did not remain limited to the closed circuits 
of correspondence with the army leadership, 
or even to the relatively isolated scientific 
milieus in which medical journals circulated. 
It was fought out publicly in the Belgian 
parliament and in the general press. In these 
41. Letter of 5 October 1840 from Jean-François Vleminckx to Jean-Jacques Willmar 
(RMAF, Service de Santé, no. 2324) : “qu’il n’avait pas une idée de notre opthalmie et 
des lésions qu’elle engendre”. 42. Idem : “[quelqu’un], qui s’est beaucoup occupé de 
maladies oculaires”. 43. Idem : “qui vivons avec le soldat, sommes identifiés avec sa 
vie, et le connaissons en état de santé comme en état de maladie”. 44. Hippolyte kluyskens. 
Des hommes célèbres dans les sciences et les arts, et des médailles qui consacrent leur 
souvenir, Gand, 1859, p. 304-305.
Drawing of the medal Jean Fierens received in 1837 from his patients, out of gratitude 
for treating them free of charge. (GuiotH, Histoire numismatique de la révolution 
belge, ou description raisonnée des médailles, des jetons et des monnaies qui ont 
été frappés depuis le commencement de cette révolution jusqu’à ce jour, Hasselt, 
Milis, 1844, pl. xxxiv)
61 Belgian Army Doctors (1830-1860)
45. [Article reproduced from the Journal des Flandres], L’indépendance belge, 4 July 
1836 :“les opérations aussi douloureuses qu’inutiles de quarante-deux médecins et chirur-
giens”. 46. Gazette van Gend, 24 May 1837, p. 3 : “dien kundigen menschlievenden en 
onbaetzuchtigen oogmeester”; GuiotH, Histoire numismatique de la révolution belge, ou 
description raisonnée des médailles, des jetons et des monnaies qui ont été frappés depuis le 
commencement de cette révolution jusqu’à ce jour, Hasselt, 1844, p. 237-238. On Fierens’ 
medal, see also : Hippolyte kluyskens, Des hommes célèbres…, p. 304-305. 47. “Ovation du 
docteur Fierens”, in Messager de Gand, 16 November 1837. 48. “Séance du samedi 13 mai 
1837”, Chambre des représentants, (http://www.unionisme.be/ch18370513.htm consulted 
on 27 March 2014) :“se disputer et écrire des brochures ‘pour’ et ‘contre’, ne fait en rien 
progresser la guérison du soldat”. 49. “Chambre des représentants. Séance du 13 mai”, in 
L’indépendance belge, 14 May 1837 : “ils n’ont pas de confiance dans les officiers de santé”. 
latter settings, the public image of army 
physicians, and of the military health service 
and the army in general, constituted a factor 
that had to be taken into account.  
The basis for Fierens’ fame lay in his reputation 
as a philanthropist. In the course of the 1830s, 
Fierens had cured many patients of ophthalmia 
free of charge, an effort for which he became 
widely praised. In July 1836, L’indépendance 
belge reported of “another extraordinary 
cure” by Fierens, who refused to be paid 
since the patient was the father of a large 
family. Another cured soldier was said to have 
endured “the painful and useless operations 
of forty-two physicians and surgeons”45. These 
miracle cures inspired a campaign, started in 
the summer of 1837 by his patients, who could 
subscribe by paying 20 centimes each, to 
publicly award “this skillful, philanthropic and 
altruistic oculist” a medal to commemorate 
his cures and talents46. The presentation of 
the medal received a great deal of coverage 
in the Belgian press. It was accompanied by 
a banquet in which politicians, such as the 
governor of East Flanders, Pierre De Schiervel, 
participated. Other reports were less sup-
portive and criticized the way Fierens had 
orchestrated the event by inviting politicians 
and journalists. Such narcissism detracted 
from his medical merits and humanitarian 
motives, commented another journalist47. If 
such remarks reflect different interpretations 
of philanthropy, they also hint at Fierens’s 
ability to construct his reputation through the 
newspapers.  
Compared to Fierens’ public reputation as a 
successful healer, army doctors’ skills were far 
less favorably described. Several interventions 
in the Belgian parliament hint at a rather 
negative perception of the military health 
service. In 1837, the Catholic parliamentarian 
Eugène Desmet recalled the harmful dis-
agreements on the nature of the disease 
among the army doctors, referring to the de-
bate between the “compressionists” and the 
“contagionists”, arguing that “by disputing and 
writing pamphlets for and against, they do not 
move forward the recovery of the soldier”48. 
In the same year, his colleague Rodenbach 
declared that the soldiers “had no confidence 
in the military physicians”49. Rodenbach re-
called a more recent debate, conducted the 
year before, on the state of ophthalmia in 
the Belgian army – a debate during which 
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50. “Ophthalmie de l’armée”, in Messager de Gand, 4 February 1836 : “Il est vrai qu’on est 
devenu plus habile à cacher ses ravages. Charlatanisme !”. 51. “Ovation du docteur Fierens”, 
in Messager de Gand, 16 November 1837 : “les escrocs puissants du service de santé”. 
52. Letter of 21 November 1837 from Pierre de Schiervel to the Secretary of War, (RMAF, 
Service de Santé, no. 2194) : “un peu de jalousie de métier”. 53. [Article reproduced from Le 
Constitutionel], Messager de Gand, 16 November 1837. 54. “Séance du 5 décembre 1837”, 
in Bulletin de la Société de Médecine de Gand, no. 3, 1837, p. 186 : “dans l’intérêt de l’art, 
de l’humanité et de son propre honneur, faire connaître les moyens qu’il a vu réussir et qui, 
d’après lui, sont les plus convenables”. 55. Ibidem : “la franchise qu’il a mise dans l’exposition 
de sa manière de faire; c’est ainsi que tout médecin devrait agir”. 
Baron Evain, Secretary of War at that time, 
had declared that the ophthalmia epidemic 
was almost suppressed. During the debate, 
it became clear that the soldiers sent home 
to recover were not included in the medical 
statistics, which hence presented a decrease. 
In the Messager de Gand such arithmetic 
was regarded as deceitful : “It is true that 
one has become more skilled in hiding its 
ravages. Charlatanism !”50. The episode also 
reflected negatively on the army’s medical 
leadership, who were regarded in the same 
newspaper as “the mighty crooks of the health 
service”51.
Against such a background, those who knew 
of Fierens’ reputation lobbied to allow him 
to test his therapy on a group of soldiers. 
The provincial governor Pierre de Schiervel, 
for example, wrote to Willmar that “a bit of 
professional jealousy” was perhaps the reason 
that Fierens’s remedy, which should not be 
doubted, had not yet been used in the army52. 
Such support was effective. Willmar decided 
that twenty soldiers were to be sent from the 
military hospital of Ghent to Beervelde to be 
treated by Fierens. Jean-François Vleminckx 
and Ferdinand Colson, the head of the Ghent 
hospital, negotiated in turn that Colson would 
simultaneously treat ten soldiers. The result 
was a comparative experiment, which took 
over a year, to determine which treatment 
for ophthalmia was superior. Already, in the 
setting up of the experiment, conflicts arose. 
Fierens first refused to treat soldiers infected 
with “chronic” ophthalmia, a demand he 
later withdrew. These quarrels were carefully 
followed in the general press – for some 
editors, who took up Fierens’ defense in their 
critique of government policy, Fierens had 
been offered “incurables” at first53. The early 
involvement of the newspapers turned what 
was in essence a scientific controversy into a 
heated political issue.   
For the military physicians, the secrecy that 
Fierens observed surrounding the nature of his 
treatment stirred much more indignation than 
the dispute over the selection of patients. In 
the Medical Society of Ghent, of which Colson 
was one of the directors, such secrecy was 
denounced. One of its members, the military 
surgeon Auguste Sotteau, declared that it was 
Fierens’ duty as a physician “to make known, 
in the name of the [healing] art, humanity 
and his own honor, the methods that he has 
seen succeed and that, according to him, 
are the most suitable”54. Colson, at the same 
meeting, contrasted his own professional 
behavior with Fierens’ silence and strategy 
of writing to the newspapers, stating that 
“it is only in a medical society that it is 
appropriate to expose the method that guides 
me in the treatment of ophthalmia”55. Colson’s 
63 Belgian Army Doctors (1830-1860)
remark reveals that debates in the medical 
sciences needed to be performed in carefully 
circumscribed professional spaces. Medical 
societies’ meetings, where an audience of 
colleagues was present, were considered the 
right spaces, while the general forum of news-
papers was instead associated with an un-
scientific polemical and commercial form of 
communication.    
Colson certainly opted for the “right” forum. In 
a lengthy speech, he elucidated the treatment 
used by the military physicians, gaining him 
the appreciation of his fellow members who 
thanked him for “the openness he displayed 
in the exposition of his method; this is the way 
all physicians should act”, and decided to 
invite Fierens to the next meeting56. Instead of 
attending the next meeting, however, Fierens 
wrote a letter to the Ghent society members 
in which he refused to engage in any scienti-
fic discussion. What followed was a sharp 
condemnation of Fierens’ conduct. Another 
military physician, François Lutens, declared 
to “throw down my gauntlet to him” to 
defend the honor of the military physicians : 
“They [the military physicians] are accused 
of ignorance, and such an accusation comes 
from men who are not known from any 
special work, from any literary production on 
the matter. These men are only known by the 
ovations of which they were the object : they 
announce miracles, they appear to possess 
secrets, specific methods, and their voices are 
heard !”57. 
As is clear from Lutens’ speech, Fierens’ 
refusal to engage debate, either by parti-
cipating in a scientific meetings or through 
the medium of publications, collided with 
the newly spread scientific standards of an 
ophthalmology rooted in experiments and 
observations. The conflict, in essence, dealt 
with the very grounds of medical authority. For 
Fierens, such authority depended on public 
and political support, while for the military 
physicians, it was rooted in the professional 
approval of one’s colleagues. 
Despite Colson’s efforts to start a scientific 
discussion, the controversy came to a close 
in the newspapers. Vleminckx and Colson 
eventually published open letters to defend 
themselves against Fierens’ claims. In one 
of these letters, Vleminckx first repeated 
an older critique of the narcissism that lay 
beneath Fierens’ philanthropy, to then inte-
grate “science” in his own, alternative view 
of medical philanthropy, as he recalled the 
meeting of the Ghent Society from which 
Fierens had been absent, claiming that “the 
moment had come to prove that with the 
philanthropist [Fierens] came also a skillful 
man”58. Such statements, however, did little 
56. Idem, p. 193 : “la franchise avec laquelle il a exposé sa méthode; c’est ainsi que tout 
médecin devrait agir”. 57. Idem, p. 11 : “On les accuse d’ignorance, et cette accusation part 
de quelques hommes qui ne sont connus par aucun travail spécial, par aucune production 
littéraire sur la matière. Ces hommes ne sont connus que par l’ovation dont ils ont été l’objet : 
ils annoncent des merveilles, ils ont l’air de posséder des secrets, des méthodes particulières, 
et leur voix est écoutée !”. 58. “À M. le docteur Fierens”, in Messager de Gand, November, 
25, 1837 : “le moment était venu pour prouver qu’avec le philanthrope se trouvait l’homme 
capable”.
64Belgian Army Doctors (1830-1860)
59. Letter of 30 November 1837 from Vleminckx to the Secretary of War (RMAF, Service de 
Santé, no. 2199). 60. Messager de Gand, 24 March 1838 : “vient de voir toutes ces couronnes 
flétries sur sa tête”. 61. Messager de Gand, 5 December 1837 :“cette querelle d’esculapes 
et de guérisseurs brevetés intéresse fort peu le pays”. 62. FrédériC Hairion, “Nouvelles 
considérations pratiques sur l’ophthalmie de l’armée”, in Archives de médecine militaire, no. 
2, 1848, p. 5-20, 73-84 and 141-160 : “déplorables conséquences”. 63. Idem, p. 77-78 : 
“le traitement exige des connaissances spéciales, qu’on ne trouve pas généralement chez 
les praticiens civils, et auxquelles les jeunes médecins sortant des universités sont aussi bien 
souvent étrangers”. 
damage to Fierens’ reputation. It was rather 
the reports of soldiers cured by Colson, 
well before Fierens could present such 
results, that were hurtful59. The editors of the 
Messager de Gand concluded that Fierens 
had become the plaything of the political 
struggle over the military health service, and 
“had seen all of his garlands wither on his 
head”60. But neither did the army doctors 
benefit from the controversy (even if Colson’s 
treatment was recognized as superior). It 
instead affirmed an older image of medical 
disagreement on military ophthalmia. “These 
quarrels of medics and certified healers evoke 
little interest in the country”, the same editors 
had already concluded61. Together with the 
parliamentary debates, public disputes re-
inforced a negative image of the army 
doctors, which corresponded to the unsavory 
reputation of the army as a whole. As long as 
Vleminckx was seen as one of the “crooks” 
of the military health service, military physi-
cians’ ophthalmological skills rarely bene-
fitted from the contemporary appreciation 
for medical philanthropy and citizenship.  
IV. Separate Roads
By the late 1840s, past efforts to contain 
military ophthalmia were looked at with a new 
self-consciousness. Most military physicians 
now recognized that the oph thalmia epide-
mic had gone beyond the army and affected 
the general population. Frédéric Hairion, 
the director of the military ophthalmological 
institute in Leuven, did not mince his 
words : the decision made in 1834 to send 
infected soldiers home to recover had 
caused “deplorable consequences”62. New 
recruits now often entered the army with eye 
infec tions contracted at home, potentially 
setting in motion anew the circulatory 
spreading of the disease between army 
and society. For Hairion, it was clear that 
further measures were needed both within 
and outside of the army. “The treatment [of 
ophthalmia] demands special knowledge”, 
he added, “which one does not generally 
find among civilian practitioners, and with 
which the young physicians who graduate 
from the univer sities are often not fami-
liar”63. Knowledge about the disease, Hairion 
seemed to suggest, was to travel with it, and 
likewise spread from the army to civilian 
society.
The creation of “civilian” ophthalmological 
institutes testified to such knowledge transfer. 
For Florent Cunier, who founded the first of 
these in Brussels in 1840, its opening went 
along with a professional shift from military 
service to civilian practice. As Cunier reflected 
on his career, “my position as an army doctor 
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was for me the occasion to give a special 
direction to my medical studies... now having 
barely entered civilian life, I have come to 
establish myself in Brussels to devote myself 
to the special practice of ophthalmology”64. 
At the same time, Cunier became responsible 
for the two rooms dedicated to eye diseases 
in the Brussels St.-Jean Hospital. Cunier’s 
career trajectory was not unique. Several 
military physicians with a background in 
treating ophthalmia became engaged in 
civilian initiatives. Soon after Cunier’s insti-
tute, similar institutes and dispensaries were 
created in Liège, Verviers, Namur, Mons 
and Ypres, and most of them were run by 
(former) army doctors65. In 1847, the Annales 
d’Oculistique reported, with some surprise, 
Constant Loiseau’s resignation from military 
service. Loiseau, who had been the founder 
of the ophthalmological institute of Namur 
two years earlier, “has in this way sacrificed 
twenty-nine years of service to devote himself 
henceforth to civilian practice and to fully 
care for the Institute that he directs”66.
What were the reasons for this change-over 
to the civilian world ? The ophthalmological 
institutes, first of all, offered a potential for 
clinical study that exceeded the research 
opportunities within the army. As their 
quarterly reports show, each of these institutes 
and dispensaries treated several hundreds of 
patients annually, offering opportunities to 
study, for example, the social geography of 
the disease. In 1848, Cunier concluded that 
military ophthalmia reigned mostly among the 
“bricklayers, carpenters, and more generally 
the workers who are packed in the tenements 
in Brussels and its suburbs”67. Besides scien-
tific potential, the ophthalmological institutes 
conferred a certain prestige upon their 
directors. They represented a form of good 
citizenship and philanthropy – a prestige 
similar to that enjoyed by Jean Fierens. Funded 
through a combination of private gifts and 
provincial subsidies, the new institutes were 
typical of the hesitant ways in which civilian 
society managed public health. Cunier’s 
institute was initially financed by donations 
and the private means of its volunteer 
physicians, but soon received a subsidy 
from the provincial council of Brabant and 
from the royal family68. Cunier himself was 
also awarded the title of “royal” physician-
64. Florent Cunier, “Compte rendu des maladies observées au dispensaire ophthalmique de 
Bruxelles, pendant le troisième trimestre 1840”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 4, 1840-1841, 
p. 73 : “ma position de médecin militaire a été pour moi l’occasion de la direction spéciale 
que j’ai imprimée à mes études médicales (...) à peine rendu à la vie civile (...) je suis venu 
me fixer à Bruxelles pour m’y livrer à la pratique spéciale de l’oculistique”. 65. The section 
Nouvelles in the Annales d’oculistique reports of the creation of these institutes in the course 
of the 1840s. 66. “Chronique”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 18, 1847, p. 192 : “M. Loiseau 
a ainsi sacrifié vingt-neuf années de services pour se vouer désormais à la pratique civile et 
donner tous ses soins à l’Institut qu’il dirige”. 67. “Clinique ophthalmologique de M. Cunier”, 
in Archives de médecine militaire, no. 1, 1848, p. 337-339 : “les maçons, les menuisiers, et 
en général les ouvriers vivant par brigades dans les logements de Bruxelles et des faubourgs”. 
In the foreign medical press as well, Cunier’s institute was praised for the opportunities it 
offered for the advancement of specialized research : edWin lee, “Mr. Lee on Belgian Medical 
Institutions”, in The London Medical Gazette, 22 and 29 September 1843, p. 898-900, 931-
933. 68. On the subsidy of 200 F. by the provincial government : “Variétés”, in Annales 
d’oculistique, no. 5, 1841, p. 176. On the gift of 200 F. from the royal family : “Variétés”, in 
Annales d’oculistique, no. 6, 1841-1842, p. 52.
The different stages of granulations of the conjunctiva around the eyes, 
typical of ‘military ophthalmia’. Those affected were hence called des 
granulés. (FrédériC Hairion, “Mémoire sur l’anatomie pathologique 
des granulations palpébrales”,  in Annales d’Occulistique, 13, 1850, 
p. 109-126)
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69. “Chronique”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 15, 1846, 261. 70. FrédériC Hairion, 
“Nouvelles considérations…”, p. 77-78. 71. “Chronique”, in Annales d’oculistique, no. 18, 
1847, p. 60. 72. evariste WarloMont, Congrès d’ophtalmologie de Bruxelles, Paris, 1858. 
73. “Revue des conférences scientifiques”, in Archives de médecine militaire, no. 1, 1848, 
p. 60. 74. “Nouvelles et fait divers”, in Archives de médecine militaire, no. 1, 1848, p. 101-
103; “Nouvelles relatives au service de santé”, in Archives de médecine militaire, no. 1, 
1848, p. 426, and no. 2, 1848, p. 406-407. 75. On Meynne’s career : karel velle, “Armand 
Joseph Meynne : legerarts en sociaal denker”, in Er is leven voor de dood : tweehonderd 
jaar gezondheidszorg in Vlaanderen, Kapellen, 1998, p. 108-110. In France as well, military 
physicians started to publish their own journal in this period : Claire FredJ, “Une maison 
d’édition au service d’une profession : Victor Rozier (1824-1890) et la médecine militaire”, 
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oculist69. Much more than his medical work 
in the military, it was his philanthropic work 
that brought him prestige in his late career.  
The creation of civil institutes also marked 
a new phase in the development of oph-
thalmology as a scientific specialty. Without 
a doubt, the ophthalmia epidemic had ex-
pedited an early specialization in the 1820s 
and 1830s. In Ghent and Leuven, chairs 
in ophthalmology had been created and a 
specialist journal had been founded. But these 
developments were tied up with the leading 
position of army physicians in the medical 
world. The challenge now seemed to lie in 
turning ophthalmology into an academic 
specialty in its own right. For Hairion, the 
increasing appearance of ophthalmia among 
the Belgian population at large necessitated 
additional clinical education. Medical stu-
dents were to visit the ophthalmological 
institutes as an extension of their theoretical 
courses in ophthalmology. He also pleaded 
for the inclusion of ophthalmology in the 
medical examinations70. The Secretary of 
Internal Affairs as well saw a major role 
for these civilian institutes as he summoned 
their directors in 1847 to discuss a natio-
nal strategy against ophthalmia – the pro-
blem now fell under his administration 
rather than under the Ministry of War71. Ten 
years later, the first international conference 
on ophthalmology was held in Brussels, 
another step in its transformation into an 
autono mous specialty, apart from military 
medicine72. 
Parallel to this process, the priorities of the 
military health service shifted as well. In the 
late 1840s, a new policy for the scientific 
advancement of military medicine was set 
out. Monthly gatherings of army doctors in 
each of the military hospitals were initiated, 
during which all sorts of scientific and 
therapeutic questions could be discussed73; 
agreements were made with the universities 
to allow army doctors to follow additional 
courses74; and a new journal was created, 
the Archives de médecine militaire, of which 
Armand Meynne became the editor-in-chief75. 
All these efforts contributed to the ambition, 
in Meynne’s words, “to give our profession a 
marked character of specialization”76. Not all 
aspects of medical practice, in Meynne’s view, 
were as important to the army doctor. Legal 
medicine, obstetrics and psychiatry were dee-
med far less central to military medicine than 
the study of fevers, and in particular, the study 
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of hygiene, “a vast field that remains to be 
explored”77. In the Archives Meynne rolled 
out a program of “hygienist” research, which 
comprised medical topography and statistics, 
food inspection and sanitation – research to-
pics which “will find a solution much more 
easily with us than with our civilian colleagues, 
who do not have, as we do, the advantage or 
the occasion to make observations across the 
entire country and in almost identical con-
ditions”78. The experimental advantages of mi-
litary medicine, previously applied to ophthal-
mology, were now recast in hygienist terms. 
How did ophthalmology fit into this new 
program? According to Meynne, army doctors 
should not “abandon a study that has cost 
us so many days and nights of laborious 
research (…) at a moment when the medical 
corps of the Belgian army may claim such a 
beautiful page in the history of the medical 
arts”79. This reasoning, however, also unveiled 
the image of ophthalmological research as 
something of the past, a successful tradition 
rather than a promising and innovative field 
of research. During the monthly conferences 
for army doctors, the treatment of eye 
infections featured sporadically, but received 
far less attention than the numerous lectures 
on ventilation, healthy food and exercise, 
each of which had to be “in harmony with 
the rules of hygiene”80. When the subject of 
ophthalmia was brought under the attention 
of the army doctors, the difficult chronic 
cases were discussed, “those men whose 
condition sometimes creates despair among 
physicians”81. On other occasions, the neces-
sity of cauterization was emphasized – yet 
those lectures were more about refreshing 
“old” knowledge than about setting up new 
research82.  
The promotion of hygiene thus surpassed the 
fight against ophthalmia among the priorities 
of the military health service in the second half 
of the century. More than a shift in expertise, 
the stronger focus on hygiene also impacted 
military physicians’ position within the army. 
It allowed them to better present their work 
as part of the army’s overall ambitions, which 
now focused less on preparing soldiers for 
war and more on turning them into to proper 
citizens. Hence the imagery of the army as a 
“school for the nation”83. Medical theories on 
77. Ibidem : “un vaste champ à explorer”. Nevertheless, psychiatry would increasingly receive 
scholarly attention among military physicians in the second half of the 19th century : ruben 
debussCHere, De militaire psychiatrie in België voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Verkenning van 
een discipline in wording, master thesis, KU Leuven, 2013. 78. [Préface]…, “trouveront 
chez nous une solution plus facile que chez nos collègues de l’ordre civil, qui n’ont point, 
comme nous, l’avantage ou l’occasion de faire des observations sur toute la surface du pays 
et dans des conditions à peu près identiques”. 79. Ibidem : “ce n’est pas au moment où 
le corps médical de l’armée belge peut revendiquer une si belle page dans cette partie de 
l’art médical, que nous abandonnerions une étude qui nous a coûté tant de veilles et de 
laborieuses recherches”. 80. Archives de médecine militaire, no. 1, 1848, p. 226-227 : “en 
harmonie avec les exigences de l’hygiène”. 81. l.F. FroMont, “Note sur le traitement des 
granulations palpébrales au moyen de la teinture d’iode”, in Archives de médecine militaire, 
no. 1, 1848, p. 441-444 : “ces hommes dont l’affection fait parfois le désespoir des médecins”. 
82. “Nouvelles relatives au service de santé”, in Archives de médecine militaire, 2, 1848, 
p. 343-346. 83. JosepHine HoeGaerts, Masculinity and Nationhood, 1830-1910. Constructions 
of Identity and Citizenship in Belgium, Genders and Sexualties in History Series, Basingstoke, 
A political cartoon testifying of the poor reputation of Belgium’s 
military health service. edouardus Braud, “Armée Belge : Service de 
santé, pharmacien, médecin, vétérinaire”, Ostende, 1865. (Collection 
Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and Military History)
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hygiene fit in well with the positive imagery 
the army leadership aimed to construct. As 
medical metaphors were used increasingly 
to describe the state of the country from 
1850 onwards – ranging from a “healthy” 
to a “degenerated” nation – the army too 
became seen in terms of the health of 
soldiers’ bodies. Physicians such as Meynne 
were now consulted for the architectural 
design of new army barracks, which were 
to be spacious and well-ventilated. And for 
soldiers’ “moral” improvement, a certain hy-
gienic consciousness was likewise regarded 
as essential84. This link between hygiene and 
morality became a central element in all sorts 
of health campaigns (e.g. against alcoholism, 
venereal diseases etc.) in the late nineteenth-
century Belgian army85. 
V. Conclusion
What has a medical historical approach added 
to our understanding of the position of the 
Belgian army in nineteenth-century society ? 
Army doctors’ struggles against military 
ophthalmia, a disease often associated with 
the army, but never strictly confined to the 
military sphere, reveal continuous interactions 
between the military and the civilian world. 
In the 1830’s and 1840’s, the members of the 
military health service participated in a civilian 
scientific world of academies, societies and 
journals. In constructing their authority as 
spe cialists on the disease, army doctors rarely 
competed with their civilian colleagues. They 
rather shaped their own profile by reacting 
against those outside of the Belgian scientific 
community, such as – in their eyes – untrained 
“oculists”, foreign ophthalmologists without 
sufficient “local” knowledge and “miracle-
working” doctors who manipulated the public. 
The early development of oph thalmology as 
a specialized field reveals, above all, that no 
clear boundaries were set between “military” 
and “civilian” medicine. Ophthalmology 
rather developed parallel to the ophthalmia 
epidemic, following the disease as it spread 
within and outside the army, shaping the 
careers of the first generation of specialists 
in the process. The easy “switch-over” of 
several prominent army doctors from military 
to civilian medical practice testifies to these 
permeable boundaries.  
This does not mean, however, that military 
medicine had no distinguishing features. 
In terms of the opportunities for medical 
study, the army’s clinical infrastructure and 
hierarchical modus operandi created ideal 
circumstances for experimental therapies – 
here lay the basis for military physicians’ fame 
as specialists in the disease. But the army was 
also sensitive to outside interference. The press 
campaigns of the rural doctor Jean Fierens 
tapped into the widely felt discontent with 
the military health service and its incapacity 
to contain the epidemic. Such discontent was 
felt both in the parliament and in society at 
large. It ensured that army doctors’ efforts 
were went over with a fine-toothed comb; 
their failures magnified in the general press 
2014, p. 43-52; liesbet nys, “De grote school van de natie. Legerartsen over drankmisbruik 
en geslachtsziekten in het leger, 1850-1950”, in Degeneratie in België, 1860-1940. Een 
geschiedenis van ideeën en praktijken, Leuven, 2003, p. 79-118. 84. JosepHine HoeGaerts, 
Masculinity…, p. 43-52. 85. nys, “De grote school…”, p. 79-118. 
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and made part of a political debate over the 
very position of the army. Put differently, their 
affiliation with the army, so often criticized for 
the unhealthy living conditions of its soldiers, 
made it difficult for them to construct a strong 
professional image. The doctor in Conscience’s 
novel was tellingly a retired army physician, 
who was praised for his philanthropy in the 
civilian world – not an active army doctor 
who successfully controlled the epidemic. 
Army doctors were well aware of this. The 
ambition of the military health service was 
precisely to counter this public image, which 
cast a shadow over their efforts. 
Finally, by juxtaposing the debates on 
mili tary ophthalmia in different settings – 
newspapers, scientific journals, the Belgian 
parliament, medical societies and the military 
health service – this article has also shown 
the potential of broadening the history of 
the Belgian army by including its role as an 
actor in the medical and scientific fields. 
Attention to developments “outside” of the 
army, such as the foundation of scientific 
journals and academic chairs or philanthropic 
initiatives, allows for a better understanding 
of the “internal” decision making within the 
military. As the case of the military health 
service has illustrated, army doctors not only 
partici pated in these civilian initiatives, the 
choices that they made as part of their mili-
tary work also responded to these develop-
ments in civilian society. Understanding this 
interconnection allows to better assess the 
impact of their medical activities. Contrary 
to contemporary public perception, the Bel-
gian army was a key site of scientific know-
ledge production in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, which certainly pro ved essential to the 
development of ophthal mology. Whether 
this holds true for other medical subfields 
as well (e.g. hygiene studies) remains to be 
explored. 
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